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NUC~PO~RRATEREGULATION 
AFTER EASTERN ENTERPRISES: ARE 
RATEPAYERS BEING TAKEN FOR A RIDE? 
CLAIRE A. WATKINS* 
Abstract: The electric industry's monopolistic reign is coming to an 
end. The movement toward deregulation is exposing as flawed the 
electric industry's decision to build nuclear power plants for the 
generation of electricity. One such flaw is the miscalculation of 
decommissioning costs. Without a monopoly, nuclear power plant 
owners have no guaranteed rate base to pay the high costs of 
decommissioning. As a result, owners are lobbying the state legislatures 
and Congress to require recovery of these costs. This comment 
questions whether it is constitutional to require ratepayers to pay for 
such costs after they no longer receive service from a power plant. 
Through an analysis of Justice O'Connor's opinion in Eastern Enterprises 
v. Apfel, which establishes that economic regulation can be a taking, the 
argument is presented that ratepayers may be able to challenge rate 
regulation after the termination of service as an unconstitutional 
taking. 
INTRODUCTION 
Under the electric industry's regulatory regime, utilities have al-
ways assumed that ratepayers should pay for costs incurred by a nu-
clear-powered utility.1 However, as deregulation becomes a reality in 
some states2 and with a proposed federal deregulation bill before the 
* Managing Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAw REVIEW, 2000-01. 
1 See generally P. Barker, M-7w Pays? An Analysis of the Allocation of the Costs of Canceled Nu-
clear Plants After Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 50 Ohio LJ. 999 (1989) (describing how a 
nuclear utility covers its operating expenses). The costs of construction, maintenance and 
decommissioning are incorporated into a utility's base rate and are amortized over a pe-
riod of time. As long as the rate is reasonable and fair, a utility consumer must pay it. See 
Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299,310 (1988); Federal Power Co. v. Hope, 320 
U.S. 591, 602 (1944) (holding that a rate must be "just and reasonable"); Smyth v. Ames, 
169 U.S. 466, 546 (1898). Additional evidence indicates that courts will only interfere if 
the rate order does not compensate a utility. See Barker, supra at 1012. 
2 Twenty-four states have deregulation laws on the books. Legislative Affairs (visited 
Nov. 19, 1999) <http://www.nado.org/legaffair futility> [hereinafter www.nado.org]. 
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House,3 perhaps it is time to challenge this assumption. Recently,4 
consumers have been protesting against the policy decisions requiring 
ratepayers to pay all or a portion of a nuclear powered utility's costS.5 
This article will discuss how ratepayers of nuclear powered elec-
tric utilities could construct a legal argument in support of their pol-
icy position. Section I describes the rise and fall of nuclear power 
within the electric industry. Section II explores the costs incurred as 
well as the regulatory mechanism used in addressing the costs in-
curred by nuclear plants. Section III explains deregulation, the cur-
rent status of the deregulation process, and how the process may af-
fect a nuclear utility. Section IV sets forth the jurisprudence regarding 
rate regulation. Finally, Section V questions the constitutionality of 
requiring ratepayers to pay for the stranded cost of nuclear utilities. 
I. THE RISE AND FALL OF NUCLEAR POWER 
This section is divided in three parts. First, Part A describes the 
history of the regulation of the electric industry. Next, Part B illus-
trates the socio-political factors that favorably influenced the public's 
perception of nuclear power. Finally, Part C shows that the factors in 
Part B that created the positive attitudes toward nuclear power may 
have been recklessly misleading to the public. 
A. Regulation of Electric Utilities 
The electric industry has been regulated since the turn of the 
20th century.6 One reason for regulating the electric industry is that 
electric utilities are considered "natural monopolies."7 A natural mo-
3 H.R. 1828, 106th Congo (1999). The Comprehensive Electricity Competition Act, 
H.R. 1828, was introduced to the House on May 17,1999 and is currently in committees. 
4 See generally SAFE ENERGY COMMUNICATION COUNCIL, THE GREAT RATEPAYER ROB-
BERY: How ELECTRIC UTILITIES ARE MAKING OUT LIKE BANDITS (1998) (describing how 
utilities are taking advantage or ratepayers) [hereinafter THE GREAT RATEPAYER ROB-
BERY J. Ever since deregulation has been discussed as a real possibility, consumers have 
begun to question the legitimacy of the regulation requiring ratepayers to pay for certain 
costs. 
5 See id. 
6 See Energy Issues/News: HistlYrical Background (visited Dec. 15, 1999) <http://www.eei. 
org/issues/history.htm> [hereinafter eei history]. In 1898, it was proposed to the Na-
tional Electric Light Association that electric companies be regulated. See id. By 1916, 33 
states had regulatory agencies. See id. 
7 See ELECTRIC POWER: DEREGULATION AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 4 (John C. Moor-
house ed. 1986). 
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nopoly is one that has an economy of scale.8 An economy of scale ex-
ists when a single company has the lowest cost of production because 
the more the company produces, the less expensive it is for the com-
pany to produce.9 Thus, economies of scale preclude competition be-
cause a single company can supply the entire market demand at a 
lower cost than could two or more companies supplying the market.10 
Regulation of natural monopolies is therefore necessary (or so goes 
the theory) to reduce the cost of providing the energy. 
Another theory supporting the regulation of the electric industry 
is that competition would waste resources. ll In the early 1900s, the 
utilities competed for customers.12 This competition created not only 
a potential for complete duplication of infrastructure (because every 
utility would have its own generating stations, power distribution net-
work, and so on), but also a potential for systems that were not com-
patible.13 However, the movement toward deregulation has rejected 
this theory because proponents of deregulation believe that competi-
tion will lower the costs of supplying electricity.14 
Thus, the result of regulation is a "monopoly, "15 otherwise known 
as a "regulatory bargain" or "compact"16 that grants a utility certain 
rights in exchange for certain obligations,l7 A public utility's first right 
under regulation is to collect a reasonable rate for its service.l8 Sec-
ond, utilities have the right to provide service at reasonable rates but 
are subject to regulation. 19 Third, when a utility provides adequate 
8 See ELECTRIC POWER, supra note 7, at 4; MargaretJess, Restructuring Energy Industries: 
Lessons from Natural Gas (visited Dec. 15, 1999) <ftp.eia.doe.gov /pub/oil~as>. 
9 SeeJess, supra note 8. 
10 See ELECTRIC POWER, supra note 7, at 4. 
11 Deregulation (visited Dec. 15, 1999) <http://www.energyland.net/deregulation/ in-
tro.as> [hereinafter Deregulation]. 
12 See eei history, supra note 6. 
15 See id. Companies used different equipment, voltages and frequencies. See id. 
14 See Deregulation, supra note 11. 
15 See ELECTRIC POWER, supra note 7, at 43. Some people doubt whether the electric 
utilities were ever a natural monopoly. See id. 
16 Adam D. Thierer, Electricity Deregulation: Separating Fact From Fiction in the Debate Over 
Stranded Cost Recovery (visited Dec. 15, 1999) <http://www.heritage.org/library/ catego-
ries/regulation> . 
17 See CHARLES F. PHILLIPS JR., THE REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES: THEORY AND 
PRACTICE 109-10 (1988). 
18 See id. at 110. 
19 See id. at 111. 
194 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 28:191 
service, it has the right to be protected from competition.2o Fourth, 
most public utilities have been given the right of eminent domain. 21 
In exchange for these four rights, a utility has four obligations.22 
First, a utility is required to serve everyone who requests service.23 
Second, utilities are required to provide safe and adequate service.24 
Third, a utility must serve all customers on the same terms.25 Fourth, 
utilities are obligated to charge no more than 'just and reasonable" 
prices for the service they provide.26 Therefore, by creating a regula-
tory compact, legislators and utility companies enter into an enforce-
able contract27 granting the utilities these rights and imposing these 
responsibilities.28 
B. The Rise of Nuclear Power 
The socio-political climate of the 1950s and 1960s laid the fertile 
ground for the development of nuclear power.29 Four of the most no-
table factors affecting this favorable climate were: (1) "Cold War" be-
liefs;3o (2) public trust in business and the government;31 (3) public 
faith in science;32 and (4) a belief that electricity sales would double 
every ten to fifteen years.33 "Cold War" beliefs, for example, encour-
aged the development of nuclear power because of the potential 
benefits such power would provide to national security.34 The McCar-
thy era, however, discouraged research into nuclear power hazards. 
Indeed, concern over the radiation dangers of atomic testing was of-
ten attacked as subversive.35 
Moreover, during the 1960s, the socio-political climate was ready 
for the development of nuclear power. The public had faith that busi-
20 See id. 
21 See id. 
22 See PHILLIPS, supra note 17, at llO. 
23 See id. at 109-10. 
24 See id. at 11 O. 
25 See id. 
26 See id. 
27 See Thierer, supra note 16. 
28 See PHILLIPS, supra note 17, at 110. 
29 See STEVEN MARK COHN, Too CHEAP TO METER: AN ECONOMIC AND PHILOSOPHICAL 
ANALYSIS OF THE NUCLEAR DREAM 17 (Roger S. Gottlieb ed. 1997). 
30 See id. at 17. 
31 See id. 
32 See id. 
33 See id. at 69. 
34 See COHN, supra note 29, at 17. 
35 [d. at 17-18. 
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nesses and political leaders ''would do right most of the time. "36 The 
government and corporate promoters of nuclear power took advan-
tage of this period of business credibility by "transforming corporate 
marketing claims about nuclear economics into conventional wis-
dom."37 
The 1960s was also characterized by a faith in the ability of sci-
ence and technology to solve social and economic problems.38 Both 
laypersons39 and scientists believed nuclear power was a "Faustian 
bargain for global affluence."4O This idea led many people to adopt 
the concept that nuclear energy was a means to achieving utopia.41 
Moreover, the belief that electric sales would double every ten to 
fifteen years for the foreseeable future also promoted a favorable cli-
mate for the development of nuclear power.42 To accommodate this 
anticipated expansion, a new source of electric energy was believed to 
be necessary.43 
Finally, in addition to favorable socio-political conditions, the 
promise of nuclear power was very compelling.44 Nuclear energy was 
heralded as a new, clean and inexpensive source ofpower.45 Moreover, 
it was offered by its proponents as a panacea: "it will give us all the 
power we need and more. Power seemingly without end . . . [po ]wer 
36 ld. at 18. In 1964, only 22% of those surveyed agreed with the statement, "You can-
not trust government to do right most of the time." ld. 
37 ld. 
36 See id. 
39 See COHN, supra note 29, at 18. Students for a Democratic Society declared, "Our 
monster cities, based historically on the need for mass labor, might now be humanized ... 
by nuclear energy .... " ld. 
40 See id. at 18. 
41 See id. 
42 See id. at 69. Some believed the demand for electricity was expected to increase by 
approximately seven percent annually for the foreseeable future. See Richard J. Pierce, 
Regulatory Treatment of Mistakes in Retrospect: CancelRd Plants and Excess Capacity, 132 U. PA. L. 
REv. 497, 500 (1984). Others believed that electricity sales would continue to double every 
decade. See Richard Goldsmith, Utility Rates and Takings, 10 ENERGY LJ. 241,241 (1989). 
43 See GREGORY B. ENHOLM & J. ROBERT MALKo, ELECTRIC UTILITIES MOVING INTO 
THE 21ST CENTURY 15 (1994). This projected growth was never realized. In fact, sales for 
electricity fell from six to eight percent to two percent. See COHN, supra note 29, at 15. An-
other result of the forecasted increase in electric sales was that the nation's electric utilities 
began an ambitious program of expansion. See Goldsmith, supra note 42, at 241. In 1967, 
the Atomic Energy Commission ("AEC") foresaw 1000 nuclear plants on line in the United 
States by the year 2000. SeeCoHN, supra note 29, at 127. 
44 See infra notes 45-46 and accompanying text describing nuclear power as a panacea. 
45 Leigh A. Riddick, Upside Down: lWw Slwuld Bear the Unanticipated Costs of NuclRar De-
commissioning?, 132 No.8 FORTNIGHTLY 31. 
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to do everything man is destined to do. We have found what might be 
called perpetual youth. "46 
As a result of this promise, the federal government began en-
couraging the development of nuclear energy47 in three ways: re-
search and development; subsidies; and pro-nuclear regulatory incen-
tives.48 Between 1951 and 1974 the federal government spent $23 
billion49 on nuclear research and development.5o During the same 
time period, the federal government's subsidies reduced expected 
nuclear power generating costs by at least fifty percent.51 While the 
government aid was intended to reduce or defer nuclear power costs, 
"[t]he Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) continued to characterize 
nuclear plant investments as 'without practical value' as late as 1970, 
in order to maintain this assistance and to protect the nuclear indus-
try from anti-trust review. "52 Simultaneously, the regulatory commis-
sions treated the nuclear utilities favorably. 53 As one economist stated: 
"When a commission is responsible for the performance of an indus-
try, it is under [inescapable] pressure to protect the health of the 
companies it regulates, to assure a desirable performance .... "54 
Commentators have suggested that this government aid resulted from 
the belief that "abundant energy was ... [the] prerequisite for per-
manent economic growth and nuclear power was a prerequisite for 
abundant energy. "55 
46 See COHN, supra note 29, at 19. While there was opposition to nuclear power, 
"[tlhese countercurrents were submerged as nuclear promoters assembled a critical mass 
of social support for nuclear technology and subsequently constructed assessment centers 
in industry, the National Laboratories, and nuclear engineering departments that were 
dominated by technological aesthetics congenial with nuclear power expansion." Id. at 20. 
47 See id. at 63. 
48 See id. at 63-83. 
49 See id. at 63 (1990 dollars) . 
50 See id. While government aid influenced utilities to construct nuclear power plants, 
the decision to build a plant was up to the utility. See Pierce, supra note 42, at 508. Fur-
thermore, the utilities had a strong economic incentive to construct nuclear power plants. 
See THE GREAT RATEPAYER ROBBERY, supra note 4, at 19. In some instances, utilities liti-
gated to force regulatory agencies to allow them to build plants. Id. 
5! See COHN, supra note 29, at 75. This government cost reduction kept people from 
realizing the full cost of nuclear power. See id. 
52 See id. 
53 See ENHOLM & MALKO, supra note 43, at 236. 
54 See Thierer, supra note 16. 
55 See COHN, supra note 29, at 69. 
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C. The Fall of Nuclear Power 
From 1967 to 1974, utilities ordered 196 new nuclear plants to be 
constructed.56 However, all forty-one reactors ordered after 1973 were 
cancelled and more than two-thirds of all nuclear plants ordered after 
January 1970 were cancelled.57 Some economists attribute the decline 
in nuclear power to a variety of reasons, including: the Organization 
of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) oil embargo;58 growing 
fear of nuclear reactors after the Three Mile Island incident;59 
inflation;6o and/or the fact that the expected demand for electricity 
never materialized.61 
The focus on external economic and social factors (described 
above in part B) to explain the rise of nuclear power, permits a 
financially unstable utility to claim that its investment in a nuclear 
power plant was prudent62 and that any failure of the plant was due to 
unforeseeable, external factors.63 This popular notion is represented 
by the findings of the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission (PUC) 
in Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch.64 The PUC found that Duquesne 
could not be faulted for initiating the construction of more nuclear 
generating capacity at the time they joined the Central Area Power 
Coordination Group (CAPCO) project in 1967.65 The PUC also found 
that the intervening events (the oil embargo, the Three Mile Island 
incident, and inflation) that ultimately confounded the predictions of 
increased electricity could not have been predicted.66 Based on the 
foregoing, the PUC ultimately found that CAPCO acted prudently.67 
56 See id. at 127. 
57 See ENHOLM & MALKO, supra note 43, at 13. 
58 See id. at 13-15. 
59 See Michael R. Lettrich, Popowsky v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission: The Supreme 
Court Holds That the Costs of Decommissioning TMI-2 may be Classified as "Operating Expenses" 
Properly Chargeable Consumers, 5 WIDENER]. PUB. L. 865,865 (1996). 
60 See ENHOLM & MALKO, supra note 43, at 16. 
61 See id. at 15. By the mid-1980s, forecasted growth had declined from six to eight per-
cent to around two percent. See Pierce, supra note 42, at 503. 
62 See Duquesne, 488 U.S. at 302-03; Pierce, supra note 42, at 502. Many utilities claim 
that the decision to build a nuclear plant was reasonable and prudent. 
63 See Duquesne, 488 U.S. at 303. This is the argument made by most utilities. 
64 See id. at 302-03. 
65 See id. at 302. 
66 See id. at 303. 
67 See id. 
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However, at least one scholar denounces this interpretation of 
the failure of nuclear power68 as mistaking "a facilitating condition for 
an underlying cause. While these external factors played a role in de-
railing nuclear power, the level of regulatory support necessary to 
transcend these obstacles was no greater than that which nuclear 
power had previously enjoyed. "69 According to this analysis, these fac-
tors merely triggered the decline of nuclear power and were not the 
cause of that decline.7o 
According to Steven Mark Cohn, associate professor of econom-
ics at Knox College, nuclear power declined because there was no re-
liable indication that new energy sources were needed71 and because 
the research and development of nuclear power focused solely on the 
positive aspects of nuclear power.72 Cohn argues that it is misleading 
to focus on external economic and social factors that portray the 
country's large nuclear power investment of the 1950s and 1960s as a 
response to a concern over available energy sources.75 As evidence of 
this claim, Cohn points to the 1958 National P~anning Association's 
study, Nuclear Energy and the U.S. Fuel Economy 1955-1980, which re-
ported there were ample fuel sources in the U.S. for centuries.74 
Similarly, in 1959, during a private presidential briefing, the AEC 
(the precursor to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC» re-
ported, "[f]or our own economy, with but few exceptions, we do not 
need atomic energy power in the foreseeable future."75 Also, in 1964, 
the Cambel study of the U.S. Energy Research and Development con-
cluded, "[t]he findings of this staff study indicate no grounds for seri-
ous concern that the Nation is using up its stocks of fossil fuels too 
rapidly; rather there is the suspicion that we are using them up too 
slowly. "76 
Additionally, representatives of the conventional fuel industries 
and utilities testified annually during the 1950s that no pressing need 
existed for alternative energy development.77 Thus, Cohn argues that 
68 See COHN, supra note 29, at 143. Steven Mark Cohn, author of Too CHEAP TO ME-
TER, disagrees with this superficial analysis of the decline of nuclear power. See id. 
69 [d. at 143. 
70 Seeid. 
71 See id. at 22-23. 
72 See id. at 17,54. 
75 See COHN, supra note 29, at 143; see also supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text. 
74 See COHN at 22. "Coal reserves in the U.S. are ample for centuries." [d. 
75 Seeid. 
76 [d. 
77 See id. 
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the concern over available resources was unfounded since there were 
ample fuel sources available.78 Moreover, according to Cohn, there 
was no compelling economic case for investment in nuclear power to 
replace other sources.79 
Instead, Cohn argues that the impetus for the expansion of nu-
clear energy was the apparent security of nuclear fuel resources (the 
United States felt there were abundant supplies of uranium in the 
U.S., Canada, Australia and South Mrica) and the expected absolute 
advantage of U.S. corporations in international nuclear competi-
tion.80 Cohn further argues that the decline of nuclear power oc-
curred because the industry had not properly researched the cost es-
timates for nuclear plants.81 While nuclear power was promoted, 
research into the hazards of nuclear power was discouraged.82 
Through the late 1960s, there was no operating experience 
data from which to derive cost estimates for commercialized 
nuclear plants. Popular projections were based on optimistic 
scaling and learning curve assumptions. These predictions 
gave only cursory attention to the economic implications of 
containing nuclear externalities, such as accident hazards 
and thermal pollution. Waste disposal and decommissioning 
uncertainties were totally ignored in economic forecasts. 83 
Thus, in the 1960s and 1970s, many utilities focused almost exclusively 
on development of nuclear power without sufficient consideration of 
the costs and concerns. For example, Bechtel, an electric equipment 
manufacturer, spent ten percent of its pre-tax profits on nuclear de-
velopment and training84 without researching negative aspects of nu-
clear power.85 The utilities' focus on overly optimistic aspects of nu-
clear power were 
more errors of omission than commission and reflect the 
[utility's] participation in a socially created realm of dis-
course, which was bounded by a collective failure to investi-
gate the economic implications of the technology's negative 
78 See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text. 
79 See COHN, supra note 29, at 24. 
80 See id. at 25. 
81 See id. at 23. 
82 See id. at 17. 
83 Id. at 23-24. 
84 SeeCoHN, supra note 29, at 53. 
85 See id. 
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externalities and an engineering hubris that minimized the 
potential problems posed by the technology'S extreme nov-
elty.s6 
Therefore, Cohn argues that the decline of nuclear power had more 
to do with the industry's internal problems (failure to research all as-
pects of nuclear power, including costs) than any unforeseeable ex-
ternal factors.s7 Many of a utility'S internal problems were the result of 
the costs associated with nuclear power. These various costs are dis-
cussed in the following section. 
II. COSTS AsSOCIATED WITH NUCLEAR POWER 
This Section discusses the different costs involved in construct-
ing, maintaining, and decommissioning a nuclear power plant. Part A 
addresses the procedure used by utilities to finance these costs; part B 
focuses on the cost of decommissioning a nuclear power plant; part C 
discusses the costs of canceled nuclear power plants; and part D ad-
dresses stranded costs. 
A. Ratemaking and Amortization 
As with any other industry, nuclear utilities have various ex-
penses.ss Under a regulatory regime, the costs are recovered through 
the rates charged to ratepayers through a process called amortiza-
tion.S9 Whether a cost will be completely or partially amortized de-
pends on whether the cost is included in the calculation of the rate.90 
The standard rate is equal to the rate base multiplied by the utility'S 
rate of return plus the utility's operating costs. Thus, the standard ra-
temaking formula is: 
R = O+(B x r) where R represents the utility'S allowed reve-
nue requirement; 0 represents the utility's operating costs; 
86Id. 
87 See id. 
88 Plant construction, maintenance, and decommissioning are a few examples of ex-
penses. 
89 See Barker, supra note 1, at 999-1000. Technically, "amortization is the process in 
which capital outlay is recovered in installments by converting the depreciation in value of 
a capital asset into a current expense, with the entire amount being recouped by the end 
of the amortization period." Id. at 1001. 
90 See id. at 1001. 
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B represents the utility's permitted rate base; and r the util-
ity's cost of capital (rate ofreturn).91 
201 
While it is customary to incorporate all prudently incurred oper-
ating expenses used in providing utility service to consumers into the 
rate base; the assumption of what expenses are prudently incurred is 
often the subject of litigation.92 The classification of a particular cost 
will determine whether a utility will recover the cost.93 If the cost is 
added into the rate base (B), the utility will recover all the cost plus a 
return on the investment.94 This places the whole burden on the 
ratepayer, while alleviating the utility'S investors of any loss.95 
Alternatively, if the cost is not included in the rate base, the inves-
tors must cover the entire cost.96 In between is an option where the 
ratepayers pay for the cost, but the investors do not receive a return 
on that portion of their investment. This approach allows the inves-
tors and ratepayers to share in the burden of covering the cost.97 The 
decision whether to include a cost into the rate base is left not to the 
utility, but rather to be determined by a regulatory commission.98 
Usually, the decision is based on whether the cost provided the con-
sumer with a service and thus had been "used and useful. ''99 
B. Decommissioning 
The utilities rely on the amortization process to recover the costs 
for one of the most expensive functions of a nuclear power plant: de-
commissioning.1oo Decommissioning is the safe removal of a facility 
from service and the reduction of residual radioactivity to a level that 
91 See id. at 1000. 
92 See Duquesne, 488 U.S. at 613-14. In this case there was a question as to whether cer-
tain operating expenses have been prudently incurred. See id. 
93 See Barker, supra note 1, at 1001. 
94 See id. 
95 See id. 
96 See id. 
97 See id. at 1003. 
98 See Barker, supra note 1, at 1001. 
99 [d. The used and useful rule is a "bedrock principle of public utility rate regulation. 
It requires that costs associated with electric power plants be paid by the ratepayers who 
benefit from the plant." See Lettrich, supra note 59, at 868. Whether a cost is used or useful 
has been the topic of much litigation but is outside the scope of this article. 
100 See The Decommissioning Crunch (visited Nov. 11, 1999) <http://www.bwgi.com/en-
ergyarticle.html> [hereinafter The Decommissioning Crunch]. 
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permits the termination of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(NRC) license. IOI The NRC grants licenses for forty-year periods. I02 
The costs of decommissioning can be analyzed in at least two set-
tings: (1) in the context of a nuclear plant that has reached the end of 
its license; or (2) in the context of a nuclear plant that closes down 
prematurely. The cost of decommissioning is high.I°3 In the next 
fifteen years, seventy nuclear plants will be decommissioned, requir-
ing a cost of an estimated $20 billion.104 While the estimated cost of 
completely decommissioning the country's nuclear plants is highly 
speculative,105 some authorities suggest the decommissioning costs 
could be up to 100% of the initial cost of construction. I06 
The calculation of a utility'S decommissioning cost can be prob-
lematic because regulators assume that the plant will operate for the 
full life of its license.Io7 However, out of the twenty-seven nuclear 
plants to shut down to date, not one has reached the expiration of its 
license.Io8 In fact, the average nuclear plant shuts down fifteen years 
prematurely.I09 Because regulators overestimate the life of nuclear 
plants in determining the rates each plant may charge, most utilities 
will not have had ample time to amortize the total costs of decommis-
sioning before the plant closes prematurely. no 
To combat this problem, the NRC has established rules to at-
tempt to ensure that each utility has a decommissioning fund 
101 See 10 C.F.R. § 50.2 (2000); see also Staff Responses to Frequently Asked Questions on De-
commissioning Nuckar Power Reactors (visited Nov. 12, 1999) <http://WMV.nrc.gov/NRC/ 
NUREGS/SRI628/part06.html> [hereinafter Staff Responses]. 
102 See Staff Responses, supra note 10 1. 
103 See The Decommissioning Crunch, supra note 100. 
104 See id. 
105 See Decommisioning (visited Nov. 11, 1999) <http://WMV.greenpeace.org/ Jommons 
/ no.nukes/ decommLhtml> [hereinafter Decommissioning]. Decommissioning costs are 
highly speculative because the detail and sophistication employed in developing an esti-
mate varies greatly and a lack of standardization makes comparison difficult. 
106 See id. 
107 Bruce Biewald & David White, Stranded Nuckar Waste: Implications of Ekctric Industry 
Deregulation for Nuckar Plant Retirements and Funding Decommissioning and Spent Fuel (visited 
Nov. 19, 1999) <http://WMV.citact.org/nucrep.html>. Many plants close prematurely due 
to their bad financial state, resulting from poor management decisions. See THE GREAT 
RATEPAYER ROBBERY, supra note 4, at 1. 
108 See Gary M. Becker, Surviving Nuckar Decommissioning, 136 No. 13 PuB. UTIL. FORT. 
22,22 (1998); U.S. NRC INFORMATION DIGEST, app. B at 103-04 [hereinafter NRC INFOR-
MATION DIGEST]. 
109 See NRC INFORMATION DIGEST, supra note 108, app. B at 103-04. Many plants close 
down before the expiration of their license because of poor management. See id. 
110 See Biewald & White, supra note 107. 
2000] Nuclear Power Rate Regulation 203 
sufficient to cover its future costs.l11 Despite the NRC's efforts, how-
ever, there has been a funding shortfall for each of the nuclear plants 
that have been closed to date.ll2 Estimates of the costs of unfunded 
decommissioning for various plants range from 2.7 billion dollars1l3 to 
24 billion dollars.1l4 
A difficult problem concerning unfunded decommissioning costs 
is deciding who will pay them, the ratepayers or investors. According 
to the used and useful rule, ratepayers should not pay for costs that 
are not attached to services received.1l5 In a scenario where ratepayers 
are expected to continue paying the utility after a premature shut-
down, the ratepayers are no longer paying for services received.116 In-
stead, it is argued, the decision to make ratepayers pay when there is 
no service provided is tantamount to a bailout of the utilities. ll7 The 
problems associated with amortizing the costs of nuclear plants are 
exacerbated when the plants are never completed in the first place 
because this means the plants do not provide a service nor do they 
generate revenue. 
111 See 10 C.F.R. pt. 30 (1975); 10 C.F.R. pt. 50 (1963). 
112 See Biewald & White, supra note 107. 
m See Regulatory Analysis on Decommissioning Financial Assurance Implementation 
Requirement for Nuclear Power Reactors, 10 C.F.R. § 3.2.2. 
114 See Biewald & White, supra note 107. 
Il5 The used and useful rule is a "bedrock principle of public utility rate regulation. It 
requires that costs associated with electric power plants be paid by the ratepayers who 
benefit from the plant." See Lettrich, supra note 59, at 868. 
116 If a ratepayer is required to pay after a plant is canceled, then they are not paying 
for services received. Some argue that it is fair to require ratepayers to continue to pay 
after a utility shuts down because they are essentially still paying for a service-the safe 
closure of the plant. This argument misses the mark. Ratepayers have already been paying 
for the service of decommissioning through their prior rates. It is no fault of the ratepayer 
that a utility makes the decision to shutdown prematurely and causes it to lose its security. 
If the utility makes the unilateral decision to prematurely shutdown, its investors should 
bear the burden of that decision. Furthermore, it can be argued that ratepayers have al-
ready paid their share of the utility'S costs. For those nuclear plants that cost several billion 
dollars to construct, it is not accurate to say that consumers bearing the brunt of those 
construction costs are "benefiting" as a result of receiving the excessively high priced elec-
tricity from the facility. See Biewald & White, supra note 107; Pierce, supra note 42, at 504-
06. Mter all, nuclear power, which was once believed to be less expensive than 
conventional power, is typically more expensive. See Riddick, supra note 45, at 1. 
117 See "Stop the Bailout" Coalition Statement/Participants, Stop the Bailout!: Don't 
Charge Consumers for Utilities' Past Mistakes (visited Dec. 15, 1999) <http://www.local.org/ 
stopbail.htm> [hereinafter Stop the Bailoutn. 
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C. Construction Costs of Canceled Plants 
A utility must obtain approval from the NRC before building a 
new nuclear power plant. The decision to construct a new nuclear 
plant is the utility's to make, however, and "the scope of the NRC's 
authority is limited and does not encompass the utility's need for ad-
ditional generating capacity. "118 Similarly, the decision to cancel a 
plant is the utility's.119 As mentioned above, over 100 nuclear plants 
have been canceled.120 The cost of these cancellations is estimated to 
be five to eight billion dollars.l21 The most problematic issue regard-
ing these costs is whether the ratepayer or the investor should carry 
the financial burden of the canceled plants.122 
Normally, a new plant can be added to a rate base if it passes the 
prudent investment test and/or the used and useful test.123 The pru-
dent investment test states that if a utility makes an investment deci-
sion that is imprudent based on information reasonably available to it 
at the time of its decision, all costs associated with that decision are 
disallowed in determining the rates the utility can charge.124 The used 
and useful test, however, has historically excluded from the rate base 
those investments in plants that are: (1) not yet operable; (2) no 
longer used; or (3) provide benefits to parties other than consumers 
of regulated services.125 
The cost of canceled construction plants do not usually pass the 
used and useful test,126 but often pass the prudent investment test.l27 
Many experts believe that utility decisions are: 
rarely blatantly imprudent when viewed in light of the 
knowledge and alternatives reasonably available to the util-
ity's management at the time of the decision .... The condi-
tions forecast by experts in the 1970's suggest that the utili-
liB Pierce, supra note 42, at 508. 
119 See id. at 510. 
120 See id. at 498. 
121 See Barker, supra note 1, at 999. Additionally, each abandoned project costs $50 mil-
lion. 
122 See id. The author believes that utilities should be allowed to recover all costs of 
canceled plants. However, ratepayer organizations contest this view. See generally Stop the 
Bailout!, supra note 117. 
123 See Pierce, supra note 42, at 511. 
124 See id. at 511-12. 
125 See id. at 512. 
126 See id. A plant that was canceled before it went on line cannot be seen as used and 
useful since it never produced a service. 
127 See Pierce, supra note 42, at 511-12. 
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ties' decisions to build new plants during that period were 
reasonable and prudent at the time they were made.l28 
205 
Thus, the prudent investment test is easily satisfied and the construc-
tion cost may be added to the rate base. As a result, the ratepayer is 
required to pay for this cost through amortization. l29 
D. Stranded Costs 
Stranded costs are investments or assets owned by regulated elec-
tric utilities that are likely to become inefficient or uneconomic under 
dereguiation.l30 Under a regulated regime, the utilities expected to 
recoup any losses sustained by raising rates on their captive customers 
who did not have the ability to switch to an alternate, cheaper sup-
plier. l3l However, if the goal of deregulation-a competitive market-
place-is realized, consumers will be free to seek out new suppliers.132 
This change means utilities will be burdened with significant debts 
and no captive consumer base from which to recoup losses.133 
The estimates for full stranded cost recovery vary from $10 bil-
lion to $500 billion.l34 Most utilities believe that the consumer should 
pay for the utility'S recovery of stranded or transition costS.135 Sup-
porters of this position offer the following reasons: (1) recovery of 
transition costs is a normal part of an industry's movement to compe-
tition; (2) recovery of transition cost would ensure that consumers 
have the best selection of electric suppliers; and (3) the regulatory 
128 See id. at 512. The belief that the decision to build new plants was reasonable sup-
ports the notion that ratepayers should compensate the utilities for their investment deci-
sions. This notion, analyzed in Section V of this article, has been challenged by Steven 
Mark Cohn. See supra notes 71-89. 
129 See Barker, supra note I, at 1002. Courts have found the decision to build a nuclear 
plant was reasonable and prudent based on the popular misconception that electric sales 
were going to increase. See Duquesne, 488 U.S. at 303-04. However, even at that time, this 
popular belief may not have been reasonable. See supra notes 62-68. 
1:50 See Thierer, supra note 16. Stranded costs actually include the costs of decommis-
sioning canceled plants, and any other expenditures or investments of the utility that will 
not be recoverable when the plant lowers its rates in a competitive market. 
m Seeid. 
1:52 Seewww.nado.org, supra note 2. 
1:5~ See Thierer, supra note 16. 
134 See id. 
1~5 See generally Energy Issues/News, Recovering Transition Costs: Key to Advancing Electricity 
Competition (visited Dec. 15, 1999) <http://www.eei.org/issues/compJeg/power6.htm> 
[hereinafter eei recovery] . 
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bargain or compact is an enforceable contract that requires the re-
covery of stranded costS.I36 
Under regulation, utilities invested and incurred expenses that 
had been approved by regulators and were incorporated into the rate 
base. I37 The move from regulation to deregulation will produce tran-
sition costs that would have been recovered under the old regulatory 
system, but are not recoverable in a competitive market. Thus, utilities 
argue that if policymakers mandate deregulation, they must also pro-
vide utilities with an opportunity to recover these legitimate transition 
costS.I38 Moreover, they argue that transition costs of the nuclear in-
dustry should be recoveredI39 since utilities recovered transition costs 
when the telecommunications, natural gas, airline, and trucking in-
dustries were deregulated.14o 
According to the utilities, if stranded costs are not recovered 
from the consumers, consumers will not be guaranteed the best selec-
tion of electric suppliers. 141 Indeed, consumers will be unable to com-
pare electricity prices from different suppliers to choose the most 
efficient, inexpensive suppliers because they will be comparing the 
utility prices of suppliers burdened by regulation with those of suppli-
ers who are not. I42 Moreover, the recovery of stranded costs from con-
sumers is required as part of the regulatory bargain that is believedI43 
to exist between utilities and states. I44 In exchange for exclusive rights 
to a geographic area, utilities were required to provide electric service 
immediately, on demand, to every consumer living or working in their 
service area.145 Thus, the utilities believe that anything less than full 
136 See id. 
137 See id. 
138 See id. 
139 See id. 
140 See eei recovery, supra note 135. This assertion is contested. Some sources claim that 
the other industries did not recover transition costs. See Stop the Bailout!, supra note 117. 
141 Seeeei recovery, supra note 135. 
142 See id. Existing utilities argue that they will be at a disadvantage because of their 
former status as regulated utilities. See id. Conversely, new firms contend that they will be 
disadvantaged because "the cost of capital (or the cost of raising or borrowing money for 
firms) would likely be artificially lower for firms enjoying generous stranded cost recovery, 
which would mean new rivals would have a more difficult time raising the money needed 
to compete with the incumbent utilities." See Thierer, supra note 16. Thus, regardless of the 
view, a difference in financial status between new and previously regulated utilities will 
exist. 
143 See Thierer, supra note 16. 
144 Seeeei recovery, supra note 135. 
145Id. 
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recovery would be a breach of this bargain, which the utilities often 
claim to be an implicit contract.l46 
The view that consumers should pay for 100% of the stranded 
costs147 is not shared by everyone.l48 Nor is the idea of a regulatory 
bargain or compact accepted by all.149 
[T] he actual validity of a "regulatory compact" is highly sus-
pect and has been questioned repeatedly by numerous ex-
perts in the field because American electricity consumers 
were never asked to sign such an agreement. Certainly, no 
utility can produce a document that proves customers are 
forever obligated to purchase power from them and them 
alone. . .. This so-called compact is one-sided; ratepayers 
were never asked if they wanted to take part in it, nor did 
they ever sign such an agreement.150 
Even the experts that do believe in the "compact" argue that its exis-
tence does not mean utilities should be compensated for future 
losses.151 Moreover, as examinations of the origins and content of the 
regulatory compact indicate, there is "little basis for the claim that 
utilities are always entitled to cost recovery and a return on their past 
investments. "152 Rather, some believe that it is the pro-nuclear stance 
of the regulatory commissions that has lulled the utilities into believ-
ing that they are entitled to full compensation.153 
Proponents of stranded cost recovery are trying to create a work-
able standard for determining who pays when costs may be recov-
146 See supra notes 16-28; see infra notes 149-153 and accompanying text. 
147 See eei recovery, supra note 135. 
148 See Thierer, supra note 16. A recent poll conducted by Research/Strategy/ Man-
agement Inc. for the Sustainable Energy Coalition shows that seventy percent of the re-
spondents believe that utilities should be responsible for their own inefficient past invest-
ments. See id. 
149 See id. 
150 Id. 
151 See id. 
IS! Thierer, supra note 16. "Because regulatory commissions across the United States 
gradually came to the unstated conclusion that it was more important to protect the health 
of the companies they regulated than the interests of customers, an entitlement mentality 
was born and nurtured among the utilities ... many utilities have come to believe they 
have a right to be compensated for all their inefficient or unprofitable investments." Id. 
153 See id. "Because so many commissions have allowed utilities to amortize their ex-
penses by raising prices on their captive customer base at will, many utilities have come to 
believe they have a right to be compensated for all their inefficient or unprofitable invest-
ments." Id. 
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ered.154 For example, one such standard is whether "a utility can show 
that it made an investment only at the insistence of regulators, and 
that it actively had resisted the action but was forced to move forward 
anyway."155 Here, if the utility makes the proper showing, it recovers 
the entire investment. Most utilities would be denied recovery, how-
ever, since they actively chose to pursue nuclear power.156 
Conversely, opponents of stranded cost recovery claim that his-
torical precedent does not require the recovery of stranded costs.157 
Moreover, they argue that the refusal of such recovery will not destroy 
the electric utility as the utilities claim.158 Rather, in the deregulated 
market, capitalism will prevail and new, more fiscally sound utilities159 
will take the place of failed ones.160 
III. DEREGULATION OF THE ELECTRIC INDUSTRY 
A. Public Utilities Regulatary Policy Act of 1978 
All of the costs associated with nuclear power would be affected 
by the deregulation of the electric industry.161 "Deregulation" is the 
restructuring of the electric power industry in an effort to eliminate 
the monopoly that has existed under regulation162 and to replace it 
with competition.163 The theory underlying deregulation is the belief 
that competition will bring increased efficiency to the industry.l64 
More likely, the deregulation of the electric industry followed the de-
regulation of telecommunications, natural gas and the airline indus-
tries.165 This restructuring process requires utilities to allow free access 
154 See id. 
155 Id. This test was approved by Dr. Jake Haulk, Research Director for Allegheny Insti-
tute for Public Policy. See id. 
156 See id. 
157 See Thierer, supra note 16. 
158 See id. 
159 See id. The new utilities will be more fiscally sound because they will not be relying 
on the false security created by regulation. See supra notes 47-55 and accompanying text. 
160 SeeThierer, supra note 16. 
161 See eei recovery, supra note 136. 
162 See Electric Power Deregulation (visited Dec. 15, 1999) <http://www.pitneysoft.com/ 
products/SWdereg.html> [hereinafter pitneysoft]. 
163 See id. 
164 See Comprehensive Electricity Competition Plan (visited Dec. 15, 1999) <http:// 
www.home.doe.gov/policy/ceca.htm> [hereinafter Plan]. 
165 See Electricity Deregulation, a Current Event (visited Nov. 19, 1999) <http://www. 
About.com> [hereinafter Current Event]. 
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to their distribution and transmission wires for all qualified sellers.I66 
The transmission and distribution of electricity are not deregulated; 
only the generation of electricity is restructured for competition.I67 
The deregulation process began with the Public Utility Regula-
tory Policies Act (PURPA), which was signed into law in 1978.168 
PURPA began the process of deregulation by ending promotional rate 
structures, encouraging energy conservation,I69 and establishing un-
conventional "Qualifying Facilities" (QFs).I70 These changes effec-
tively created new rate structures, as well as new guidelines and incen-
tives for more efficient and environmentally friendly power 
generation.I7l 
PURPA also required that utilities buy power from industries that 
generated power as a byproduct of their business.172 Thus, PURPA 
opened generation markets to independent power producers 
(IPPs).173 This indirectly ended the monopolization enjoyed by utili-
ties by allowing any unregulated cogenerator or renewable energy 
producer that could sell electricity into the power grid, with regulated 
utilities helpless to dictate the terms of their entrance into the indus-
try. 174 
PURPA, however, was limited in its effect. It did not create a 
competitive market for electrical power)75 PURPA QFs did not actu-
ally compete with regulated utilities since those companies were re-
quired by law to purchase whatever power came their way from the 
cogenerators. I76 Nevertheless, PURPA had a large impact because the 
QFs represented a source of power the utilities could not control)77 
166 See Plan, supra note 164. 
167 See id. 
166 See Current Event, supra note 165. 
169 See Powering a Generation: Understanding Deregulation #1: Restructuring or Deregulation? 
(visited Nov. 21, 1999) <http://www.si.edu/nmah/csr/powering/deregl.html> [herein-
after Powering a Generation]. 
170 See Powering a Generation, supra note 169. QFs are independent power producers 
under PUPRA. See Thierer, supra note 16. 
171 See Current Event, supra note 165. 
172 See id. 
In Seewww.nado.org, supra note 2. 
174 See Powering a Generation, supra note 169. 
175 See id. 
176 See id. 
177 See id. 
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B. 1992 Energy Policy Act 
The 1992 Energy Policy Act178 ("the Act") moved the electric in-
dustry even closer to deregulation by requiring competition among 
wholesale producers.179 The Act mandated wholesale generation of 
power over the transmission grid from one electric utility to an-
other,180 It also required utilities that owned transmission lines to al-
low others to access the lines.181 (This means that a new generator of 
electricity could use the already existing transmission lines con-
structed and operated by other utilities, rather than building its 
own.) 182 Again, though, these requirements only affected wholesale 
transactions,183 Despite this limitation, the Act left open the option for 
competition on the retail level by allowing state legislatures and regu-
latory commissions to deregulate when and if they chose to do so.184 
C. Comprehensive Electricity Competition Act 
On March 25, 1998, the Clinton Administration released its 
original "Comprehensive Electricity Competition Plan."185 The subse-
quent bill, The Comprehensive Electricity Competition Act (CECA), 
was introduced to Congress onJune 26, 1998,186 As of 1999, CECA was 
still in committee,187 
The purpose of the proposed legislation is to ensure that state-by-
state deregulation of retail nuclear power creates a truly competitive 
market so that the industry operates as efficiently as possible,188 It 
embodies the Clinton Administration policy of "encourag[ing] all 
[s]tates and non-regulated utilities to consider and embrace the 
benefits of retail competition, while retaining the flexibility to address 
local needs. "189 This idea is accomplished by requiring each utility to 
permit retail customers to independently choose a supplier by Janu-
178 42 U.S.C. § 13201; 16 U.S.C. § 797; 25 U.S.C. § 3505. 
179 Seewww.nado.org, supra note 2. 
180 See id. 
181 See id. 
182 That is the end result of requiring utilities to open their transmission lines to other 
producers. 
183 Seewww.nado.org, supra note 2. 
184 See id. at 6. 
185 See Plan, supra note 164. 
186 See id. 
187 SeeH.R. 1828, 106th Congo (1999). 
188 See Plan, supra note 164. 
189 [d. 
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ary 1, 2003.190 However, a flexible provision permits states and non-
regulated utilities to opt out of this requirement if consumers would 
be better served by an alternative policy or the current monopoly sys-
tem.191 
Additionally, the proposed legislation contains a proposal that 
would allow (but not guarantee) utilities to "recover prudently in-
curred, legitimate, and verifiable retail stranded costs arising from the 
transition to retail competition, if such costs cannot reasonably be 
mitigated. "192 This policy provision has been implemented with re-
spect to wholesale costs.I93 However, the states would continue to de-
termine recovery of stranded costs under state law.194 Nevertheless, 
the Administration recommends that the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC) be given authority to provide a back-up mecha-
nism for stranded cost recovery where a state lacks authority to pro-
vide such recovery due to state constitutional constraints or other ju-
risdictional gaps.I95 Thus, the Act supports and encourages stranded 
cost recovery for the utilities, but it requires the states to fashion their 
own recovery procedures. 
D. State Progress: Survey oJ Current Status oj States' Deregulation196 
Thus far, the restructuring of the retail electric industry has been 
accomplished on a state-by-state basis.I97 To date, twenty-four states 
have deregulated their electricity markets,198 and the remaining states 
are currently considering such legislation. l99 Although all states are 
not at the same stage in the deregulation process, most states permit 
or are considering the permissibility and/or appropriateness of 
stranded cost recovery.200 A few states even allow for full recovery of 
190 See id. 
191 See id. 
192Id. 
193 See Jess, supra note 8. "FERC has ruled that electric utilities should recover 100% of 
their legitimate and verifiable stranded wholesale costs." Id. 
194 See Plan, supra note 165. 
195 See id. 
196 See generally Status of State Electric Industry Restructuring Activity as of Dec. 1, 1999 (vis-
ited Dec. 15, 1999) <http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricty/chg_str/regmap> [here-
inafter Status of State]. 
197 See generally Plan, supra note 165. 
198 Seewww.nado.org, supra note 2. 
199 See Status of State, supra note 197. 
200 See id. 
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stranded costs without requiring utilities to mItIgate their losses.20I 
This means utilities would not share the burden of recovering 
stranded costs. 
The mechanisms for recovering stranded costs are varied. Some 
of these mechanisms include requiring exit fees,202 securitization,203 
reasonable mitigation measures,204 nonbypassable customer transition 
charges,205 and/or using a formula for recovering lost revenue.206 
Whichever method is used, partial or full recovery for a utility's 
stranded costs are ensured. 
IV. SUPREME COURT CASES ESTABLISHING RATE REGULATION 
JURISPRUDENCE 
A. Traditional Takings Jurisprudence 207 
Traditional jurisprudence holds that unreasonable rates consti-
tute unconstitutional takings of a utility's property.208 The first case to 
address utility regulation is Smyth v. Ames.209 In that case, the Court 
held that a public utility was deprived of its property without due pro-
cess when the regulatory commission did not allow the utility to raise 
its rates. 210 The Court relied on the 14th Amendment's "takings" pro-
vision, which prohibits the deprivation of property without due proc-
201 See id. Alabama, Texas and Massachusetts allow for 100% of stranded cost recovery. 
Seeid. 
202 See id. Alabama is an example of this. See id. The Michigan proposal allows for full 
recovery of stranded costs using exit fees through 2007. See id. 
203 See Thierer. supra note 16. Securitization is the process by which a utility is allowed 
to sell bonds to cover stranded costs. Connecticut requires securitization. See Status of State, 
supra note 196. 
204 See Status of State, supra note 196. Maine is an example. See id. 
205 See id. Montana and Ohio are examples of this. See id. Rhode Island permits a cus-
tomer transition charge of 2.8 cents per kilowatt-hour. See id. 
206 See id. Illinois uses such a formula. See id. 
207 These cases are characterized as traditional since these cases establish rate regula-
tion jurisprudence. There is a distinction between these cases and Eastern Enterprises, which 
is not a rate regulation case. 
208 See generally Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299 (1988) (holding rate regu-
lation is constitutional if the total effect of the rate order cannot be said to be unreason-
able); Federal Power Co. v. Hope, 320 U.S. 591 (1944) (holding rate regulation is constitu-
tional if the total effect of the rate order cannot be said to be unreasonable); Smyth v. 
Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898) (holding rate regulation is constitutional if the utility receives a 
fair return on the value of that which it employs for public convenience). 
209 169 U.S. 466 (1898); see Goldsmith, supra note 42, at 243. 
210 Smyth, 169 U.S. at 523. 
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ess of law.211 The Court held that a utility was entitled to a fair return 
on "the fair value of the property being used by it for the convenience 
of the public. "212 However, the Court warned that the rights of the 
public should not be ignored.213 
The public cannot properly be subjected to unreasonable 
rates in order simply that stockholders may earn divi-
dends .... If a corporation cannot maintain such a [facility] 
and earn dividends for stockholders, it is a misfortune for it 
and them which the Constitution does not require to be 
remedied by imposing unjust burdens upon the public.214 
The Smyth "fair value" test was used to determine reasonable rates 
until 1944. In that year, the landmark case, Federal Power Comm'n v. 
Hope Natural Gas Co. City of Cleveland,215 replaced the fair value test 
with what came to be known as the "end result" test. 216 This test did 
not consider the theory behind the regulation, but rather focused on 
the impact of the rate order.217 "If the total effect of the rate order 
cannot be said to be unjust and unreasonable, judicial inquiry ... is at 
an end. "218 Like the Smyth Court, the Hope Court acknowledged the 
interests of consumers. In dicta, the Court stressed the importance of 
a rate that balances investor and consumer interests.219 However, this 
balance could be set aside if the "total effect"220 of the rate order was 
"unjust and unreasonable in its consequences. "221 
Based on the Hope test, an investor could argue that there is an 
"unconstitutional taking of property when a utility that has made a 
211 See id. 
212 Id. at 546. 
213 See id. at 545. 
214 Id. The Court's acknowledgement of the ratepayers' interest is routinely repeated 
throughout the traditional cases. While the quoted material appears to create a basis for 
ratepayers to construct an argument, the ratepayers' interest has always been ignored. See 
Drobak, From Turnpike to Nuclear Power: The Constitutional Limits on Utility Rate Regulation, 65 
B.U. L. REv. 65,67 (1985). While Supreme Court cases have established in dicta protection 
of the public interest, the prevailing analysis has focused on only the part of the doctrine 
that protects investors. See id. 
215 320 U.S. 591. 
216Id. at 602. 
217 See id. 
218Id. 
219 See id. at 603. 
220 Hope, 320 U.S. at 602. 
221 Id. at 602; see Goldsmith, supra note 42, at 249. Although a balance between inves-
tors and consumers was required, most jurisprudence focused only on the part of the doc-
trine that protects investors. See Drobak, supra note 214, at 67. 
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substantial investment in serving the public interest is denied recov-
ery of its investment from ratepayers. "222 However, the test does not 
require that a utility recover all or any of its costs.223 The test merely 
states that as long as the rate, in the aggregate, allows for a just and 
reasonable return on its capital, the rate is constitutiona1.224 There-
fore, as the Ohio Supreme Court observed,225 "the Constitution no 
longer provides any special protection for the utility investor. "226 
In Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch,227 the Supreme Court affirmed 
the holding of Hope, finding that the proper focus of ratemaking is 
the end result of the rate, and not on the method used to determine 
the rate.228 Duquesne arose after the Pennsylvania legislature passed 
Act No. 335, which provided that: 
the costs of construction or expansion of a facility under-
taken by a public utility producing ... electricity shall not be 
made a part of the rate base nor otherwise included in the 
rates charged by the electric utility until such time as the fa-
cility is used and useful in service to the public.229 
The utility claimed that this Act constituted an unconstitutional tak-
ing under the Fifth Amendment because the Act prohibited the re-
covery of certain costs.230 However, the argument failed because the 
Duquesne Court interpreted the Hope rule, that the constitutional in-
quiry is focused on the end impact and not the method, to mean that 
the states are free to enact any method of ratemaking so long as the 
end result is fair and reasonable.231 
This line of traditional regulation jurisprudence may be affected 
by Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel.232 While Eastern Enterprises involves the 
coal mining industry (rather than the electric industry), its holding 
has the potential to alter the takings jurisprudence of the more tradi-
tional cases.233 
222 See Barker, supra note 1, at 1006. 
223 See id. at 1006--07. 
224 See id. 
225 See Drobak, supra note 214, at 116. 
226 Dayton Power & Light Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 447 N.E.2d 733, 740 (1989). 
227 488 U.S. 299 (1989). 
228 488 U.S. at 310. 
229 66 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1315 (Supp. 1988). 
230 488 U.S. at 305. 
231 See Barker, supra note 1, at 1011. Fair and reasonable for whom? Thejurisprudence 
assumes that the question of reasonableness is phrased to protect the utility. 
232 524 U.S. 498. 
233 See id. at 522-23. 
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B. The Effect of Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel on Rate Regulation 
Jurisprudence 
215 
For most of the twentieth century, employers in the coal industry 
have negotiated with the United Mine Workers of America (UMWA) 
regarding the provision of employee benefits to coal miners. 2M East-
ern Enterprises ("Eastern") was founded in 1929, at a time when coal 
operators provided health care to their employees through a prepay-
ment system funded by payroll deductions.235 Beginning in the 1930s 
and continuing into the 1990s, the issue of health benefits created 
tension between the miners and the coal industry.236 Mter several 
failed attempts to create a benefits plan that would be agreeable to 
the miners and the industry, Congress intervened and passed the 
Coal Act.237 The Coal Act incorporated clauses from two earlier failed 
agreements238 that mandated that signatories of the agreements 
would be required to contribute as long as they remained in the coal 
business, regardless of whether they signed a subsequent agree-
ment.239 
From 1929 until 1965, Eastern conducted extensive coal mining 
operations.24O As a signatory to both earlier agreements, Eastern made 
contributions of over $ 60 million to the coal miner funds. 241 In 1963, 
Eastern transferred its coal-related operations to a subsidiary, Eastern 
Associated Coal Corporation (EACC). 242 EACC had agreed to assume 
all of Eastern's coal mining liabilities.243 Eastern retained its stock in-
terest in EACC through a subsidiary, Coal Properties Corporation 
(CPC) until 1987.244 In 1987, Eastern sold its interest in CPC.245 CPC 
and EACC agreed to assume responsibility for payments to the Benefit 
Plan.246 Therefore, Eastern was no longer in the coal industry, but was 
considered "in business" within the meaning of the Coal Act. 247 
2M See id. at 504. 
255 Seeid. 
256 Seeid. at 504-15. 
2!7 See Eastern Enterprises, 524 U.S. at 504. 
256 See id. at 510. 
239 See id. 
240 See id. at 514-16. 
241 See id. at 516. 
242 See Eastern Enterprises, 524 U.S. at 516. 
243 See id. 
244 Seeid. 
245 See id. 
246 See id. 
247 See Eastern Enterprises, 524 u.s. at 516. 
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Mter the enactment of the Coal Act in 1992, Eastern was assigned 
responsibility for paying the premiums of over 1000 retired miners.248 
In response, Eastern sued the Commissioner, the Combined Fund, 
and its trustees.249 Eastern claimed that the Coal Act, either on its face 
or as applied, violated substantive due process and constituted a tak-
ing of its property in violation of the Fifth Amendment.25o The District 
Court granted summary judgment for the respondents (the employ-
ees) on all claims, upholding the Coal Act's constitutionality.251 The 
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed. 252 
In a plurality decision announced on June 25, 1998, four mem-
bers of the Supreme Court held that the Coal Act amounted to an 
unconstitutional taking,253 while a fifth justice, Justice Kennedy, wrote 
that although there was no taking, the Coal Act violated substantive 
due process.254 Justice O'Connor's opinion broke new ground as she 
extended the application of the Takings Clause to economic regula-
tion. 255 Justice O'Connor reached this decision by focusing on the jus-
tice and fairness of the action.256 To do this, O'Connor identified 
three factors: "the economic impact of the regulation, its interference 
with reasonable investment backed expectations, and the character of 
the governmental action. "257 
V. ANALYSIS 
This Section embodies the legal analysis and the policies support-
ing the argument that stranded cost recovery is not permissible under 
the Takings Clause. 
248 See id. at 517. 
249 See id. 
250 See id. 
251 See id. 
252 See Eastern Enterprises, 524 U.S. at 517. 
253 See id. at 538. 
254 See id. at 549. 
255 See id. at 522-23. 
256 See id. 
257 Eastern Enterprises, 524 u.s. at 522-23 (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 
U.S. 164, 175 (1979». 
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A. Potential Implications of Deregulation and Eastern Enterprises on the 
Ratemaking Process 
Until now, any discussion of an unconstitutional rate assumed 
that ratepayers had to pay a reasonable rate to a utility.258 In light of 
Eastern Enterprises and the reality of deregulation, it may be possible 
for ratepayers to formulate a legal argument that certain rates are im-
permissible because they amount to an unconstitutional taking of a 
ratepayer's property. The constitutionality of rate regulation is based 
upon the assumption that ratepayers pay a reasonable rate for serv-
ices. A rate that was not reasonable was considered confiscatory and 
amounted to an unconstitutional taking of the utility's property with-
out just compensation.259 Now it may be possible to argue that rate 
regulation is an unconstitutional taking of ratepayers' property. 
1. The Holding of Eastern Enterprises Can Be Applied to Rate 
Regulation 
Unlike the traditional cases, including Smyth, Hope, and Duquesne, 
Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, is not a typical rate regulation case.260 In 
fact, Eastern Enterprises does not involve a public utility.261 However, the 
case is applicable to the nuclear power industry because of the plural-
ity's unique approach to a subject analogous to the rate regulation of 
public utilities. 
The economic regulation of the Coal Act is analogous to the rate 
regulation of Public Utility Commissions (PUCs) because both situa-
tions involve a third party mandating that someone (i.e., ratepayers in 
rate regulation or coal businesses in Eastern Enterprises) pay a fixed 
amount to another party (i.e., a utility or retired coal mine workers). 
Although the two situations may appear to be inversely related (in the 
rate regulation context, individuals are paying a company; in the East-
ern situation, a company was paying individuals), the analogy holds 
258 See Hope, 320 U.S. at 602 (stating, "if the total effect of the rate order cannot be said 
to be unjust and unreasonable, judicial inquiry is at an end"). The constitutional question 
relating to rate regulation focused primarily on the reasonableness of the rate as it affected 
the utility. While superficial attention was given to the interests of the ratepayer in the 
form of a "balancing test," the consumer's interest would be swiftly ignored if the result 
was a confiscatory rate. See Duquesne, 488 U.S. at 307-08. Therefore, the courts started with 
the assumption that a rate must be paid, the only real question was how much. 
259 Duquesne, 488 U.S. at 307-08. 
260 See Eastern Enterprises, 524 U.S. at 522-23. 
261 See generally Eastern Enterprises, 524 U.S. 498 (1998) (Eastern Enterprises discusses 
the impact of economic regulation that effects a taking). 
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true. First, both cases involve a prescribed transfer of property from 
one person to another. In addition, companies are treated as indi-
viduals under the Fourteenth Amendment.262 
Justice O'Connor noted that the facts of Eastern Enterprises did not 
present the "classic taking"263 "in which the government directly ap-
propriates private property for its own use. "264 
Although takings problems are more commonly presented 
when "the interference with property can be characterized 
as a physical invasion by government, than when interfer-
ence arises from some public program adjusting the benefits 
and burdens of economic life to promote the common 
good," economic regulation such as the Coal Act may never-
theless effect a taking.265 
Furthermore, Justice O'Connor quickly dismissed the idea that a tak-
ing does not occur simply because the law takes property from A and 
gives it to B, instead of giving it to the government.266 Rather, a taking 
can occur even though economic regulation requires that the prop-
erty be given to a third party rather than the government.267 
According to Justice O'Connor, in order for a government action 
to effect a taking, the '1ustice and fairness"268 of the action must be 
examined.269 The three factors that determine '1ustice and fairness" 
are: (1) the economic impact of the regulation; (2) its interference 
with reasonable investment backed expectations; and (3) the charac-
ter of the governmental action.270 Assessing the economic impact of a 
regulation, Justice O'Connor found that the Coal Act forced a con-
siderable financial burden upon Eastern since Eastern's cumulative 
payments under the Act would be between $50 to $100 million.271 
262 See Smyth, 169 U.S. at 522. 
263 See Eastern Enterprises, 524 U.S. at 522-23. Justice O'Connor's takings analysis, how-
ever, did not comprise a majority of the Court. Justice Kennedy, who concurred in the 
result but not in the reasoning, analyzed the issue under substantive due process. See w. 
Under Kennedy's analysis, the Coal Act was unconstitutional because it was retroactive in 
nature. See id. at 548. 
264 Id. at 522-23 (quoting United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 78 
(1982) ). 
265 Id. (citations omitted). 
266 See id. 
267 See Eastern Enterprises, 524 U.S. at 522-23. 
268 See id. 
269 See id. 
270Id. (quoting Ko,iser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 175). 
271 See id. at 529. 
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Moreover, while the liability of Eastern was not a permanent physical 
occupation of its property,Justice O'Connor noted that the "statutory 
liability for multiemployer plan benefits should reflect some 'propor-
tionality to its experience with the plan.'''272Justice O'Connor empha-
sized that Eastern "ceased its coal mining operations in 1965 and nei-
ther participated in negotiations nor agreed to make contributions in 
connection with the Benefit Plan under the 1974, 1978, or subsequent 
National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement (NBCWA)."273 Thus, 
Eastern's financial obligations under the Coal Act constituted an un-
fair economic burden. 
2. The Economic Impact of a Regulation 
As in Eastern Enterprises, nuclear power ratepayers could argue 
that the economic impact of the rates that they are required to pay, 
which are designed to recover stranded costs, amounts to an unrea-
sonable financial burden. The aggregate cost of decommissioning is 
estimated in excess of $20 billion,274 the total estimate of stranded 
costs is $200 to $300 billion,275 and the estimated costs of canceled 
plants are $15.3 billion.276 Similarly, ratepayers could argue that rate 
regulations requiring ratepayers to pay for transition costs lack pro-
portionality when ratepayers have already paid for the "benefits" of 
nuclear power.277 Mter all, ratepayers have been paying for the service 
of the electricity they have received. It is disproportional to force 
ratepayers to pay additional rates for services for which they have pre-
viously paid. Finally, ratepayers could also argue that they neither par-
ticipated in nor agreed to the regulatory bargain or compact that the 
utilities claim exists.278 
272 Eastern Enterprises, 524 U.S. at 528-29. 
27! Id at 530. 
274 See The Decommissioning Crunch, supra note 100. 
275 See Stop the Bailout!, supra note 117. 
276 See Public Citizen, Study Shuws Electricity Deregulation Could Cause Unfunded Nuclear 
Waste Liabilities That May Exceed $50 BiUion (visited Dec. 15, 1999) <http://www.citizen. 
org/press/pr-elec3.htm> [hereinafter Public Citizen]. 
277 See Biewald and White, supra note 107. New nuclear plants did not lower costs as 
originally promised. Instead, the plants raised costs by 50 percent in some cases. See Pierce, 
supra note 42, at 505. 
278 See Stop the Bailout!, supra note 117; Thierer, supra note 16. 
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3. Interference with Reasonable Investment-Backed Expectations 
With respect to the second factor, investor-backed expectations, 
Justice O'Connor focused mainly on the retroactivity of the Coal Act 
in Eastern Enterprises.279 Since retroactive legislation can deprive citi-
zens of legitimate expectations and upset settled transactions, it pres-
ents problems of unfairness that are more serious than those posed by 
prospective legislation.28o Justice O'Connor found that the Coal Act 
operated retroactively by divesting Eastern of property long after the 
company believed its liabilities under the 1950 agreement were set-
tled.281 
Analogously, the ratepayers could argue that their expectations 
are unfairly disrupted by retroactive rate regulation.282 First, ratepay-
ers can claim that they had settled expectations: they had invested 
their share of money by paying rates to. the utilities when they were 
captive ratepayers. Indeed, the ratepayers were forced to pay higher 
rates, sometimes by fifty percent, so that utilities could recover the 
costs of new nuclear plants even though the plants did not lower the 
cost of electricity as promised.283 
Additionally, ratepayers could argue that rate regulation, which 
requires consumers who have stopped receiving power from a nuclear 
power source to continue paying that source for its past benefits, is 
unfair. Ratepayers have already paid for (or "invested" in) the benefit 
of the power through the amortized rates they had previously paid to 
the source. Requiring the ratepayer to pay the source after it has 
279 See Eastern Enterprises, 524 U.S. at 532-33. 
280 See id. 
281 See id. at 535-36. 
282 The utilities' investment-backed expectations likewise support the conclusion that 
ratepayers should not have to pay transitional costs. Put simply, there is no reasonable basis 
on which utilities can rely to expect to recover stranded costs after deregulation. The regu-
latory bargain and compact, while a myth, will not even be arguably applicable after de-
regulation because deregulation will end the utility'S monopoly. This means that without 
captive ratepayers, no utility should expect to recover all costs. Another reason for sup-
porting the theory that utilities have no investment backed expectations is that after Hope, 
the possibility of the public interest outweighing the investor interest was real. See Hope, 
320 U.S. at 603. Therefore, anyone investing in utilities after Hope either knew or should 
have known of the risk that profits would be withheld someday to further the pubic inter-
est. See Drobak, supra note 214, at 106. Furthermore, requiring consumers to continue to 
pay an old source when it is receiving no benefit is patently unfair. Some may argue that 
the whole community benefits from the safe and responsible decommissioning of the 
plant, and thus, the old ratepayers are receiving a benefit from their rates. However, I ar-
gue that since the whole community is benefiting, the whole community, and not just old 
ratepayers, should pay for the cost of decommissioning. 
283 See Pierce, supra note 42, at 505. 
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changed to another source is retroactive. When a ratepayer leaves the 
nuclear source, that relationship has ended and the ratepayer is left 
with the expectation that his or her responsibility to pay rates has 
terminated. Therefore, an argument can be made to support the the-
ory that rate regulation affects the investment-backed expectations of 
ratepayers. 
4. Character of the Government Action 
With respect to the third factor, the character of the government 
action, Justice O'Connor found the nature of the governmental ac-
tion in Eastern Enterprises quite unusua1.284 
That Congress sought a legislative remedy for what it per-
ceived to be a grave problem in the funding of retired coal 
miners' health problem in the funding of retired coal min-
ers' health benefits is understandable; complex problems of 
that sort typically call for a legislative solution. When, however, 
that solution singles out certain employers to bear a burden that is 
substantial in amount, based on the employers' conduct far in the 
past, and unrelated to any commitment that the employers made or 
to any injury they caused, the governmental action implicates 
fundamental principles of fairness underlying the Takings 
Clause.285 
Justice O'Connor's rationale for finding the government's action to 
be unfair and violative of the Takings Clause is arguably applicable to 
nuclear ratepayers because the continued recovery of stranded costs 
places a burden on some ratepayers and not others and therefore is 
unfair. 
With the fear that deregulation will cause some utilities to be-
come financially unstable, utilities have asked state legislatures and 
Congress to ensure their recovery of stranded costS.286 Thus far, the 
response has been that the states, the PUCs and/or possibly Con-
gress287 have allowed for stranded cost recovery.288 This recovery re-
284 See Eastern Enterprises, 524 U.S. at 537. 
285 [d. (emphasis added). 
286 See supra notes 155-186 and accompanying text. See generally Status of State, supra note 
196; Plan, supra note 164. 
287 See Plan, supra note 164. If and when the Comprehensive Electricity Competition 
Act is passed in its original form, it will allow for stranded cost recovery. See id. 
288 See supra notes 192-200 and accompanying text. 
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quires present consumers to carry the burden of fixing financial prob-
lems relating to nuclear energy. 
The unfairness289 of this solution is twofold. First, it is unfair to 
force an individual to pay for a utility's future costs based on an indi-
vidual's past or present use of power.290 Second, the utilities (with the 
help of the government) created nuclear energy plants.291 While it 
may be true that the government's aid influenced some utilities to 
build the plants,292 these plants were built with the intention of mak-
ing a financial return. However great the government influence, utili-
ties ultimately chose to build the plants293 that are not charging rate-
payers who no longer benefit from the utilities' service. It is time to 
stop the corporate welfare294 and treat these utilities as any other in-
vestment that does not receive special treatment from the govern-
ment. 295 Mter all, it does not make sense to continue sinking money 
into an investment that is not only losing money, but is also danger-
ouS.296 
5. Alternate Substantive Due Process Analysis 
As noted above, Justice O'Connor's opinion did not represent a 
majority of the court.297 Justice Kennedy reached the same conclusion 
289 See Eastern Enterprises, 524 U.S. at 523-24. Justice O'Connor's opinion speaks of the 
inquiry into the fairness of the government action in question. The inquiry into fairness 
"require[s] that economic injuries caused by public action must be compensated by the 
government, rather than remain disproportionately concentrated on a few persons." [d. 
290 This is unfair because a former consumer should not have to pay for future costs 
from which the consumer may not be benefiting if they change utilities. Moreover, it is 
discriminatory. "[T]he decision to charge present ratepayers for [future costs] unjustly 
discriminates against present ratepayers by charging them for the cost associated with elec-
tricity provided to past consumers." Lettrich, supra note 59, at 877. 
291 See supra notes 33-55. 
292 See supra notes 47-55 and accompanying text. Without the subsidies, favorable regu-
lation, and money for research and development-which cut the cost of nuclear generat-
ing costs by fifty percent-some utilities would not have been able to afford to build nu-
clear plants. See COHN, supra note 29, at 75. 
293 See Pierce, supra note 42, at 50S. 
294 The term "corporate welfare" is used by the "Stop the Bailout" Coalition to describe 
the stranded cost bailout. See Stop the Bailout!, supra note 117. 
295 Even if one argues that nuclear power plants are a societal concern because their 
safe decommissioning is important to the welfare of all, the solution needs to include eve-
ryone, and not just those individuals who mayor may not have received a service from the 
utility but are within the utility'S region. 
296 Unquestionably, nuclear power plants are dangerous. There have been at least 
three major nuclear plant problems: (1) at Three-Mile Island; (2) at Chernobyl; and (3) in 
Japan. 
297 See Eastern Enterprises, 524 U.S. at 53S. 
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as O'Connor but used a substantive due process analysis.298 A due 
process analysis offers support to the ratepayers' argument that a 
regulation requiring payment for previous service (which has already 
been paid for) is retroactive and thus patently unfair under a due 
process analysis.299 This theory offers the possibility for ratepayers to 
argue that a rate regulation requiring recovery to stranded costs is 
unconstitutional because it is retroactive in nature and therefore vio-
lates substantive due process.3OO Therefore, a ratepayer wishing to 
challenge the constitutionality of a rate might argue that the rate is 
unconstitutional because it violates both the Takings Clause and the 
due process clauses. 
B. Policy Arguments 
With deregulation a reality in some states, regulatory commis-
sions no longer set the rates.301 Instead, market competition estab-
lishes the rates.302 As a result, consumers are free to choose the source 
that is cheapest.303 Although this freedom hurts utilities that formerly 
had a captive rate base and relied on the expectation that the con-
sumer base would remain constant in determining the appropriate 
distribution of costs over the time of their governmental lease, rate-
payers argue that a utility should not be able to harness in present or 
former ratepayers by requiring them to pay for lost transition costs (or 
stranded costs) even though they may have changed suppliers.304 To 
many, this effort by the utilities to recover their losses is a gross ineq-
uity and should be challenged.305 
1. Ratepayers Should Not Be Responsible for the Unreasonable and 
Imprudent Decisions of Utilities 
The justification for making the ratepayers pay for the utilities' 
stranded costs is that the utilities acted prudently and reasonably 
when they invested in the nuclear plants.306 This popular notion is 
298 See Ul. at 546--49. 
299 See id. The Due Process Clause forbids retroactive legislation. See id. 
300 See supra notes 284-285 and accompanying text. 
:101 See supra notes 162-165 and accompanying text. 
:102 See id. 
:103 See id. 
304 See generally THE GREAT RATEPAYER ROBBERY, supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
:105 See Stop the Bailout!, supra note 117. 
300 See Duquesne, 488 U.S. at 302-03; Pierce, supra note 42, at 502, 511; Barker, supra 
note 1, at 1005. 
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represented by the finding of the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commis-
sion (PUC) that Duquesne could not be faulted for initiating the con-
struction of more nuclear generating capacity at the time they joined 
the Central Area Power Coordination Group (CAPCO)307 project in 
1967.308 The PUC also found that the intervening events that ulti-
mately confounded the predictions (the oil embargo, the Three-Mile 
Island incident, and inflation) could not have been predicted and 
therefore the utility had been reasonable in its decision to invest in 
nuclear power.309 Based on the foregoing, the PUC ultimately found 
that CAPCO acted prudently.310 
However, this popular notion is based on the fact that people in 
the industry deliberately chose to be ignorant of the negatives of nu-
clear power.311 This type of blind ignorance is unacceptable in tort 
cases.312 It should be unacceptable that utilities turned a blind eye to 
the negative aspects of nuclear energy. If investors and other mem-
bers of the nuclear industry did not make fully informed decisions 
about their investments in nuclear power, these investments can 
hardly be called reasonable or prudent. Nuclear energy was a new 
source of power that needed much research.3l!I Refusing to do this 
research was unreasonable and imprudent. Furthermore, even if nu-
clear plants had been prudent investments, there is no law or ration-
ale that states that utilities should recover 100% of costs. Indeed, the 
case law does not require such a result.314 
307 See Duquesne, 488 U.S. at 302. The CAPCO project involved four utilities that 
planned to construct seven large nuclear generating plants. See id. 
!lOS See id. 
309 See id. at 303. 
310 See id. 
m See supra notes 35, 72 (discussing the focus on positive research only). 
312 See ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAw AND POLICY: NATURE, LAw, AND 
SOCIETY 895-97 (2d ed. 1998) (citing United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975». In envi-
ronmental tort cases, the defendant may not claim as a valid defense that he or she delib-
erately remained ignorant of disposal methods of hazardous waste. See Park, 421 U.S. at 
671-72. Park, the president of Acme Markets, Inc., was charged with violating the Federal 
Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.CA. § 332. See id. Park's defense was that he had dele-
gated the job of monitoring sanitary conditions to others. According to the court that, "the 
defendant had, by reason of his position in the corporation, responsibility and authority 
either to prevent in the first instance, or promptly to correct, the violation complained of, 
and that he failed to do so." PLATER, supra at 895-97. 
313 See supra notes 49-55 and accompanying text (discussing federal funding for nu-
clear research). 
314 Professor Drobak's article suggests the current interpretation of rate regulation 
cases is not the only interpretation. See also Duquesne, 488 U.S. at 301-02; Federal Power 
Co. v. Hope, 320 U.S. 591, 602 (1944); Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 546 (1898). Their 
holdings only require that investors receive a reasonable return, not a full return. See id. 
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Nor can investors argue that they had no choice but to invest in 
nuclear power. Individuals invested in nuclear plants because they 
believed money could be made. Any more of an altruistic description 
is inaccurate.315 Unlike the investors who gambled with their money 
by making the choice to invest, consumers had no choice and took no 
part in the decision to build the plants.316 The choice to invest should 
neither be under-estimated nor under-analyzed. As the Court in Smyth 
stated, the investment is the responsibility of the investors; if the in-
vestment fails, "it is a misfortune for ... them which the [C]on-
stitution does not require to be remedied by imposing unjust burdens 
upon the public."317 
2. Utilities Are Not Guaranteed a Profit Under Regulation 
The utilities claim that they deserve to recover stranded costs in a 
deregulated, competitive market, even though under regulation, 
these same utilities were not guaranteed a profit.318 "The U.S. Su-
preme Court has been clear: losses in the market place are the result 
of the operation of market forces, not of the state. "319 If regulation, 
with its pro-utility slant,320 did not insulate utilities from lost revenues, 
why should deregulation-the process of creating a free market-pro-
tect the utilities from market forces? 
3. Regulatory Compacts Are Void as Against Public Policy 
Utilities have no right to hold consumers hostage in a monopolis-
tic system where the consumers had no part of the decision. There is 
nothing fair about asking individuals, hospitals, and schools to pay for 
services they neither asked for nor need.321 Consumers were never 
asked to take part in any "agreement. "322 These "agreements," or 
"compacts," are one-sided, obligating a consumer to purchase elec-
315 The characterization of a public utility as private property that is devoted to public 
use is misleading: the utility is not "devoted" to the public but rather is "devoted" to the 
idea of making a profit. 
316 The decisions were those of the utilities and the regulatory commission. See Pierce, 
supra note 42, at 508. 
m Smyth, 169 U.S. at 545. 
318 See Hope, 320 U.S. at 603. "Regulation does not ensure that a business shall produce 
net revenues." [d. 
319 THE GREAT RATEPAYER ROBBERY, supra note 4. 
320 See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text. 
m See Stop the Bailout!, supra note 117. 
322 SeeThierer, supra note 16. 
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tricity from one utility forever. In the alternative, if there ever was a 
"compact," one could easily argue that it was a contract of adhesion 
because the ratepayer had no bargaining power, and no choice to ac-
cept or reject the "compact." The doctrine of unconscionability de-
termines that contracts of adhesion are void. Therefore, ratepayers 
should not be obligated to pay the utilities for stranded cost recovery. 
4. The Imposition of Costs on Investors Improves Utility Efficiency 
Regulatory reasons exist to justify the imposition of costs on the 
investors, as opposed to the customers. "First, this cost allocation 
would reduce the incentive for excessive capital investment thought 
to exist in utility regulation. Second, it would also stimulate the re-
sponse of the competitive market to wasted investment. "323 Finally, it 
causes shareholders to "bear the risk of changes in the energy and 
capital markets and the regulatory risks inherent in the use of such a 
potentially dangerous and heavily regulated product as nuclear 
power. "324 Thus, holding the utilities accountable for their past in-
vestments might ensure that they proceed more carefully with invest-
ments in the future. 
5. Consumers Have Paid Enough to Utilities 
Consumers have paid enough to the utilities.325 Nuclear energy 
did not fulfill its promise of being "too cheap to meter. "326 The cost of 
construction was sometimes ten times the estimated price, and the 
price of the electricity was sometimes fifty percent more than before 
the utility was built.327 Who paid for these costs? The consumers, of 
course. For example, due to the Three-Mile Island accident, consum-
ers were required to pay $433 million for the reactor's construction 
costs, $125 million for cleanup of the accident, and $1 billion in re-
placement power costs.328 In addition, the consumers were required 
to pay the cost of decommissioning the plant.329 Thus, it is hard to say 
that consumers, bearing the brunt of these costs, are "benefiting" as a 
323 See Drobak, supra note 214, at 123. 
324Id. 
325 See Lettrich, supra note 59, at 876-77. 
326 See COHN, supra note 29. 
327 See Pierce, supra note 42, at 505. 
328 See Lettrich, supra note 107, at 876-77. 
329 See id. 
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result of receiving the excessively high-priced electricity from the facil-
ity.330 
6. Refusal of Cost Recovery Will Not Destroy the Industry 
Finally, the electric industry will survive even if stranded costs are 
not recovered.331 As a scare tactic, the industries claim that anything 
short of 100% recovery will destroy the industry.332 While it is true 
that some utilities may not survive deregulation if their stranded costs 
are not recovered, why would society continue to support fiscally un-
sound utilities? If a plant cannot survive deregulation, it probably 
should not be allowed to continue to operate.333 Moreover, stranded 
cost recovery could endanger the future of a competitive market. 334 
"[I]f every new rival [utility] that wanted to enter a new service region 
and offer competing service were forced to pay hefty stranded cost 
recovery tax to the incumbent utility, fewer firms would be likely to 
look to enter the market. "335 
CONCLUSION 
Nuclear power, as an energy source, had been heralded as a safe, 
cheap, and clean source of power that would become a panacea for 
our nation's energy needs. However, nuclear power was adopted by 
the government and utilities before the requisite investigation and 
research needed to make an informed decision were performed. 
Along with the government's interest in nuclear power came the gov-
ernment's financial support. Mter a utility'S decision to construct a 
nuclear power plant, the government would provide financial aid to 
the utility. 
Shortly after the first nuclear power plants were built, both the 
government and utilities learned that the "perceived" or "expected" 
benefits of nuclear power were not materializing and would not mate-
~!!O See Biewald & White, supra note 107. 
m See Stop the Bailout!, supra note 117. In fact, some believe stranded cost recovery will 
stifle competition, not improve it. [d. 
mSee generally eei recovery, supra note 135. Stranded cost recovery is needed to keep 
utilities competitive in competitive market. [d. As a response to this claim, the FERC has 
ruled that electric utilities should recover 100% of legitimate and verifiable stranded costs. 
See Jess, supra note 8. 
m Many nuclear power plants are fiscally unsound. See THE GREAT RATEPAYER ROB-
BERY, supra note 4. 
~:!4 Thierer, supra note 16. 
~~5 See id. 
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rialize. Ultimately, this disappointment meant that creating and sup-
plying the energy via nuclear power plants was not as cost effective for 
the utilities as they had originally anticipated. The government and 
the regulatory commissions, having realized the difficult financial 
situation of the utilities, continued to support and regulate them in a 
manner that would allow the utilities to continue to survive their fiscal 
difficulties. 
In light of current deregulation, there will be no regulatory 
commissions to support the financially unsound utilities. Conse-
quently, many utilities will not survive in a deregulated, competitive 
market. The only way for these struggling utilities to remain viable is 
to recover their stranded costs. However, stranded cost recovery is un-
acceptable. "While it is true that the government encouraged nuclear 
plant construction, the ultimate choice to build a plant was up to the 
utility. Thus, the utilities made the decision to invest in nuclear power. 
The fact that these determinations were based on insufficient infor-
mation is unfortunate. However, it was the utilities' mistake. The rate-
payers should not be held responsible for mistakes of the utilities, nor 
should they be held responsible for a utility'S poor decisions. 
